SYMPOSIM
Products Liability: Economic Analysis
and the Law
Foreword
In 1966 the American Association of Law Schools and the American
Economic Association formed their first Joint Committee to consider
some problems of common interest to lawyers and economists. It was
hoped that economists might become more aware of the current intellectual problems faced by lawyers and that lawyers might become
more aware of the contributions that the discipline of economics
could make to solving these problems. With the generous financial
assistance of the Walter E. Meyer Institute of Law, a project was developed to serve these dual purposes.
A legal area which had not been the subject of extensive economic
analysis, products liability, was selected to be surveyed by a leading
economist. His responsibility was to prepare a critique of the implicit and explicit economic content of the more important legal literature. This paper would then be distributed for comment to two
economists and two law professors, and finally a group of interested
economists and law professors would meet to discuss these five papers.
The Committee was fortunate to secure the services of Professor
Roland N. McKean to prepare the initial paper. Professor McKean
reviewed the legal history of the shift from the older caveat emptor
philosophy to the nearly strict liability of producers today. He analyzed the market effects of the various liability rules and examined
a whole range of issues in modem welfare economics. Transaction
costs and information costs implicit in various legal rules were considered, as were wealth redistribution effects.
As commentators on McKean's paper, the Committee selected economists James Buchanan and Robert Dorfman and law professors
Guido Calabresi and Grant Gilmore. Each of these commented on a
different aspect of the McKean paper, and each comment in itself
is a fairly integrated piece of legal-economic scholarship. The results of these efforts and the ensuing meeting held at Stanford University in March, 1968 are now made available in the succeeding pages.
The editing of the meeting transcript raised special problems. At-

The University of Chicago Law Review

tributions were frequently missing, and some important statements
were lost to the static of the recording tape. But, more telling, the
materials had to be pared down considerably to meet the space demands of this Review. Special editorial effort was made to ensure
that what remained of the transcription would follow logically and
with continuity upon the five papers, would add some important
new thoughts to the subject, and, hopefully, would clarify the areas
still left to be explored.
It is interesting in retrospect to see how dose the discussion sometimes came to an intellectual resolution of issues, even though this
was probably not apparent to the participants. There was, for instance, a general acceptance by the participants of the critical importance of transaction costs. Had the group pursued more carefully
Dean Keeton's explicit probing of the meaning of that phrase, both
the economists and the lawyers might have sharpened their communications with each other. Further, had the group pursued Professor
Calabresi's efforts to compare explicitly the transaction costs with a
rule of caveat emptor and those under a rule of caveat venditor, they
may have developed a better understanding of the empirical issues
involved.
The group probably spent too little time discussing various aspects of the market for insurance and its relation to products liability. Probably the most pregnant thought along that line was Professor Reder's suggestion that every sale is in effect a tie-in of the
product and some implicit agreement about liability. Transaction
costs, he assumed, prohibit a more specific sale of insurance with the
sale of every product, though this does occasionally occur.
For some reason the group did not discuss the economics of private
litigation and the potential effects of a broader use of class actions in
this area. Nor were alternatives to private litigation considered, except perhaps in a passing reference to workmen's compensation.
No matter how all the issues might be resolved logically, there
would still remain the nagging demurrer of Professor Gilmore that
it really does not make any difference since legal change is more related to sociology, psychology and politics than it is to economics.
Perhaps this is so, but most of the participants seemed to feel that
desirable legal effects -wpuld ultimately flow from sound economic
analysis. And hopefully the exercise published here will have intellectual influence well beyond the small question of what a judge may
do with his next products liability case.
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